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ABSTRACT Cyber Supply Chain(CSC) system is complex which involves different  sub-systems  performing various tasks. 
Security in supply chain is challenging due to the inherent vulnerabilities and threats  from any part of the system can be 
exploited at any point within the  supply chain. This can cause a severe disruption on the overall business continuity.  Therefore, 
it is paramount important  to understand and predicate  the threats so that organization can undertake necessary control 
measures for the supply chain security. Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) provides an intelligence analysis to discover unknown 
to known threats using various properties including threat actor skill and motivation, Tactics, Techniques, Procedure (TTP), 
and Indicator of Compromise (IoC). This paper aims to analyse and predicate threats to  improve cyber supply chain security. 
We have applied Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) with Machine Learning (ML) techniques to analyse and predict the threats 
based on  the CTI properties. That allows to  identify the inherent CSC vulnerabilities so that appropriate control actions can 
be undertaken for the overall cybersecurity improvement. To demonstrate the applicability of our approach, CTI data is 
gathered and a number of  ML algorithms, i.e., Logistic Regression (LG), Support Vector Machine (SVM), Random Forest 
(RF) and Decision Tree (DT), are used to develop predictive analytics using the Microsoft Malware Prediction dataset. The 
experiment considers attack and TTP as input parameters and vulnerabilities and Indicators of compromise (IoC) as output 
parameters. The results relating to the prediction reveal that Spyware/Ransomware and spear phishing are the most predictable 
threats in CSC. We have also recommended relevant controls to tackle these threats. We advocate using CTI data for the ML 
predicate model for the overall CSC cyber security improvement.   
 
INDEX TERMS: Cyber Threat Intelligence; Machine Learning; Cyber Supply Chain; Predictive Analytic; Cyber Security; 
Tactic Techniques Procedures 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Cyber Supply Chain (CSC) security is critical for reliable 
service delivery and ensure overall business continuity of 
Smart CPS. CSC systems by its inherently is complex and 
vulnerabilities within CSC system environment can cascade 
from a source node to a number of target nodes of the overall 
cyber physical system (CPS). A recent NCSC report 
highlights a list of CSC attacks by exploiting vulnerabilities 
that exist within the systems [1].  Several organizations 
outsource part of their business and data to the third-party 
service providers that could lead any potential threat. There 
are several examples for successful CSC attacks. For 
instance, Dragonfly, a Cyber Espionage group, is well 
known for targeting CSC organization [2,3]. The Saudi 
Aramco power station attack halted its operation due to a 
massive cyberattack [1]. There are existing works that 
consider CSC threats and risks but a lack of focus on threat 
intelligence properties for the overall cyber security 
improvement. Further, it is also essential to predict the 
cyberattack trends so that the organization can take the 
timely decision for its countermeasure. Predictive analytics 
not only provide an understanding of the TTPs, motives and 
intents of the threat actors but also assist situational 
awareness of current supply system vulnerabilities. 
 
This paper aims to improve the cybersecurity of CSC by 
specifically focusing on integrating Cyber Threat 
Intelligence (CTI) and Machine Learning (ML) techniques 
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to predicate cyberattack patterns on CSC systems and 
recommend suitable controls to tackle the attacks. The 
novelty of our work is threefold:  
• Firstly, we consider Cyber Threat Intelligence(CTI) for 
systematic gathering and analysis  of  information about 
the threat actor and cyber-attack by using various 
concepts such as threat actor skill, motivation, IoC, TTP 
and incidents. The reason for considering CTI is that it 
provides evidence-based knowledge relating to the 
known attacks. This information is further  used to 
discover unknown attacks so that threats can be well 
understood and mitigated. CTI provides intelligence 
information with the aim of preventing attacks as well 
as shorten time to discover new attacks.  
• Secondly, we applied ML techniques and classification 
algorithms and mapped  with the  CTI  propreteis to 
predict the attacks. We use several classification 
algorithms such as Logistic Regression (LG), Support 
Vector Machine (SVM), Random Forest (RF) and 
Decision Tree (DT) for this purpose. We follow CTI 
properties such as  Indicator of Compromise (IoC) and 
Tactics, Techniques and Procedure (TTP)  for the attack 
predication.  
• Finally, we consider  widely used cyberattack dataset to 
predict the potential attacks [6]. The predication focuses 
on determining threats relating to Advance Persistent 
Threat (APT), command and control and industrial 
espionage which are relevant for CSC [7] [8] [9]. The 
result shows the integration of CTI and ML techniques 
can effectively be used to predict cyberattacks and 
identification of CSC systems vulnerabilities. 
Furthermore, our prediction reveals a total accuracy of 
85% for the TPR and FPR. The results also indicate that 
LG and SVM produced the highest accuracy in terms of 
threat predication. 
The rest of the paper is organised  as follows: Section 2 
presents an overview of related works including  CSC 
security, cyber threat intelligence and Machine Learning for 
CSC. Section 3 provides the concepts necessary for the 
proposed approach and the meta model. Section 4 provides 
an overview of the proposed approach including the 
integration of CTI and ML. Section 5 presents the underlying 
process for the threat analysis and predication. Section 6 
implements the process for the threat predication using the 
widely used Microsoft malware datasets. Section 7 discusses 
the results and compares the work with the existing works in 
the literature.  Finally, Section 8 provides conclusion and 
future direction of the work.  
   
II.RELATED WORK  
There exists several widely used CTI and ML models in 
cyber security domain.  This section presents the existing 
works that are relevant with our work. 
A. CYBER SUPPLY CHAIN(CSC) SECURITY 
The CSC security provides a secure integrated platform for 
the inbound and outbound supply chains systems with third 
party service provider including suppliers, and distributors to 
achieve the organizational goal [10]. Cybersecurity from 
supply chain context involves various secure outsourcing of 
products and information between third party vendors, and 
suppliers [11]. This outsourcing includes the integration of 
operational technologies (OT) and Information technologies 
(IT) running on Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) 
infrastructures. However, there are threats, risks and 
vulnerabilities that are inherent in such systems that could be 
exploited by threat actors on the operational technologies 
and information technologies of the supply inbound and 
outbound chains systems. The outbound chain attacks 
include data manipulations, information tampering, 
redirecting product delivery channels, and data theft. The IT 
risks include those attacks on the cyber physical and cyber 
digital system components such as distributed denial of 
service (DDoS) attacks, IP address spoofing, and Software 
errors [12]. Regarding CSC security, NIST SP800 [13] 
proposed a 4 tier framework approach for improving critical 
infrastructure cybersecurity that incorporates the cyber 
supply chain risk management framework into it as one of its 
core components. Tier 1 considers the organizations CSC 
risk requirement strategy. Tier 2 considers the supply chain 
associated risk identifications including products and 
services in the supply inbound and outbound chains. Tier 3 
implementation considers the risk assessments, threats 
analyses, associated impacts and determine the baseline 
requirements for governance structure. Tier 4 consider real-
time or near-time information to understand supply chain 
risk associated with each product and service. However, the 
approach and tiers considered risks management but did not 
emphasize on ML and threat prediction for future trends in 
the CSC domain.  Additionally, [14]  proposed a supply 
chain attack framework and attack patterns that structured 
and codifies supply chain attacks. The goal of the framework 
was to provide a comprehensive view of supply chain attacks 
of malicious insertion across the full acquisition lifecycle to 
determine the associated threat and vulnerability 
information.  
  
B. CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE (CTI) 
Cyber threat intelligence (CTI) gatherings and analysis have 
become one of the relevant actionable intelligences used to 
understand both known and unknown threats [4]. The impact 
of cyberattacks and emerging threats on CSC systems and its 
devastating effects on business process, data, Intellectual 
Property, delivery channel, and cost of recovery has 
increased the surge for CTI approach. The CTI process 
includes identification, threat analysis and information 
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disseminating to stakeholders. Considering CTI for 
cybersecurity, ENISA in [4] explored the opportunities and 
limitations of current threat intelligence platforms by 
considering CTI implementation process and threat 
intelligence programs (TIP) from strategic, tactical and 
operational goals. The authors proposed a threat intelligence 
program model that collects, normalize, enrich, correlate, 
analyse and disseminate threat related information to 
stakeholders. The strategic CTI goals consider factors that 
support executive decision makings, tactical goals consider 
the CTI process and TIP programs that identifying 
intelligence gap and prioritizing them for risk reduction. The 
operational goals provide a process that provides an 
understanding of the threat actors motives, modes of 
operation, intents, and TTPs and capabilities. However, the 
processes do not incorporate ML threat predictions. 
Additionally, [15] proposes a threat intelligence-driven 
security model that considers six CTI phases and processes 
lifecycle required to identify intelligence goals. The CTI 
phases include direction, collection, process, analysis, 
dissemination, and feedback. The author incorporated 
internal sources such as network traffic, logs, scans; external 
sources such as vulnerability database, threat feeds; and 
human sources such as the dark web and social media into 
the model for the threat intelligence modelling. The threat 
intelligence driven security model emphasizes on using 
network traffics, logs and scans and not ML algorithms for 
the prediction. Further, [16] develop cyber threat Intelligence 
metrics that consider assets, requirement business 
operations, adversary, and consumer intelligence places 
emphases on value and organizational benefits. The author's 
approach considers four key stages in the threat intelligence 
process including intelligence requirements, information 
collection, analyses, dissemination, and intelligence usage. 
However, the approach does not consider machine learning 
for predicting invisible attacks. Furthermore, [17] proposed 
a CTI model that operationalizes and analyses adversarial 
activities across the lifecycle of an organization business 
process to determine actions taken by the attacker. The 
author's approach was based on the organizational 
intelligence requirements, information gathering, analyses 
and disseminate to protect assets for strategic, tactical and 
operational understanding and situational awareness. 
However, the works emphasized more on attacker motive 
and intent and not on ML for the threat predictions. The CTI 
functional process is to collect metrics and trend analysis for 
the business risk assessment, prioritization, and decision 
support with less emphasis on ML for CSC security.   
 
C. MACHINE LEARNING IN CSC SECURITY 
There are several works that consider Machine Learning 
classifiers in various cybersecurity application domains such 
as spam filters, antivirus and IDS/IPS to predict cyberattack 
trends [18][23][24]. Considering ML for Security [11], 
proposed ML classification of HTTP attacks using a decision 
tree algorithm to learn a dataset for performance accuracies 
and automatically label a request as valid or attack.  The 
authors developed a vector space model used commonly for 
information retrieval to build a classifier to automatically 
label the request as malicious in the URL. The approach 
achieved high precision and recall comparatively.  However, 
the work did not focus on ML and threat prediction in the 
CSC environment. Further, [20] carried out the feasibility of 
a study on machine learning models for cloud security to test 
the models in diverse operation conditions cloud scenarios.  
The authors compared Logistic Regression, Decision Tree, 
Naïve Bayes, and SVM classification algorithms techniques 
to learn a dataset for performance accuracies. The algorithms 
represent supervised schemes and are used in network 
security. The result shows an accuracy of 97% in anomalous 
packet detections. However, the work did consider CSC 
security from threat prediction in the supply chain 
environment.  Furthermore, [21] surveyed data mining and 
ML methods for cybersecurity detection methods for cyber 
analytics in support of intrusion detection in cybersecurity 
applications. The authors used Artificial Neural Network, 
Association rules, Fuzzy Association rules and Bayesian 
Networks classifiers to learn the datasets and provided 
comparison criteria for the machine learning and data mining 
models to recognize the types of the attack (misuse) and for 
detection of an attack (intrusion).  However, the techniques 
and methods used are not ML models and did not focus on 
ML and threat prediction in the CSC environment. 
Additionally, [22] review the cybersecurity dataset for ML 
algorithms used for analyzing network traffic and anomaly 
detection. The author compared the machine learning 
techniques used for experiments, evaluation methods and 
baseline classifiers for comparison of the dataset. The results 
show significant flaws in some dataset during feature 
selection and are not relevant for modern intrusion detections 
datasets. However, the review did not stress on the current 
dataset we used from the Microsoft Malware Threat 
Prediction website for the prediction. Moreover, [23] 
explored the classification of logs using ML techniques on a 
decision tree algorithm to learn a dataset that models the 
correlation and normalization of security logs. The goal of 
the ML techniques is to evaluate if the algorithm can predict 
the performance of classification as an attack or not after a 
training phase.  The dataset used contains anomalous and 
some identified attacks. The result shows that the DT 
algorithm was model on internet logs to develop a 
framework for the normalization and correlation of the 
classify with an accuracy of 80%. However, the 
classification model did not compare other classification 
algorithms such as SVM, LR and RF that are relevant for ML 
better performance accuracies and threat analysis.  
Another initiative [24] explores the viability of 
using machine learning approaches to predict power systems 
disturbance and cyberattack discrimination classifiers and 
focuses specifically on detecting cyberattacks where 
deception is the core tenet of the event [24-30]. The authors 
in [24] evaluated the classification performances on, NNge, 
OneR, SVM, RF, JRpper and Adaboost algorithms to learn 
the dataset and focused specifically on detecting cyber 
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attacks where deception is the core tenet of the event. For 
example, in [25], the authors proposed a SCADA power 
system cyberattack detection approach by combining a 
correlation-based feature selection (CFS) method and K-
Nearest-Neighbor (KNN) instance-based learning (IBL) 
algorithm. The combination was useful to reduce the 
extremely large number of features and to maximize 
cyberattack detection accuracy with minimum detection time 
cost. In [26], an ensemble-learning model for detecting the 
cyberattacks of SCADA-based IIoT platform is proposed. 
The model was based on the combination of a random 
subspace (RS) learning method with random tree (RT).  The 
authors in [29] proposed a deep-learning, feature-extraction-
based semi-supervised model for cyberattack protection in 
the trust boundary of IIoT networks.  The proposed approach 
was adaptive to learn unknown attack. However, the works 
did not consider CSC attacks from supplier inbound and 
outbound chains. 
Regarding ML predictive analytics on various 
datasets, [28] predicted cybersecurity incidents using ML 
algorithms to distinguish between the different types of 
models. The authors used text mining methods such as n-
gram, bag-of-words and ML techniques to learn dataset on 
Naive Bayes and SVM algorithms for classification 
performance. The experiment was to predict classification 
accuracies of malware incidents response and actions.  The 
approach did not consider CTI and ML in the CSC system 
environment. Further, [29] proposed a risk teller system that 
analyses binary file appearance logs of a machine to predict 
which machines are at risk of experiencing malware 
infection in advance. The authors used a random forest 
algorithm and semi-quantitative methods to build a risk 
prediction model that creates a profile to capture usage 
patterns. The results associate each level of risk to a machine 
infection incident with 95% true positive precision. 
Besides,[30] characterize the extent to which cybersecurity 
incidents can be predicted based on externally observable 
properties of an organization’s network. The authors used 
Verizon’s annual data breach investigation report to forecast 
if an organization may suffer cybersecurity incidents in 
future. A random forest classifier was used against over 1000 
incident reports taken from various datasets. The predictive 
result achieved an overall accuracy of 90% true positives. 
However, the work did not provide any inference and map 
the prediction to existing attacks. 
 
All these works above are important and contributed towards 
the improvement of cyber security by using various ML 
techniques  . However, there is a lack of focus on the overall 
CSC security context. A limited works emphasize on threat 
intelligence data for the attack predication. For instance, due 
to the invisibility nature of cyberattacks, an attack on the 
CSC system network node has the potential to cascade to 
other nodes on the supply chain system. Therefore, it is 
necessary to use ML analytics to predict cyberattacks, threats 
and the underlying vulnerabilities. Additionally, there is a 
need to understand an organisational context for the threat 
analysis . CTI can effectively support to achieve that goal. 
This  work contributes towards this direction. In particular, 
we have integrated CTI for threat gathering and analysis with 
the   ML for the threat prediction so that organizations can 
determine the suitable control measure for the overall CSC 
security improvement. 
III. FRAMING CONCEPTS 
This section presents the conceptual view of the proposed 
approach by combining concepts from both CTI and CSC.  
 
A. CSC THREAT MODELLING CONCEPTS 
This section considers the concepts that are necessary to 
determine CSC vulnerabilities, goals, requirements, attacks 
the cyber supply inbound and outbound chains security and 
the CTI domain [2]. Threat modelling provides a systematic 
approach to identify and address the possible threats based 
on a specific context. It provides an understanding of threat 
actor who can attack the system and possible assets which 
can be compromised. The proposed approach considers  a list 
of concepts that aid understand the threts and possible 
mitigation. The concepts  provide a view of the relationships 
between organizational and  security goal, requirements, 
threat actors, attacks, vulnerability, TTPs and indicators of 
compromise for understanding of the threat. An overview of 
the concepts is given below: 
 
Goal: A goal represents the strategic aim of an organization. 
Properties for the goal include the organizational goal, the 
tangible assets required such as infrastructures to achieve the 
goal and intangible asset such as credit card information, 
health record, and other sensitive data for the security goal. 
The organizational goal is the process, product or service that 
is carried out. The assets are tangible and intangible assets 
including the network infrastructures. The security goal is 
the mechanism, configuration, and control put in place to 
achieve the goal.  
Actor consists of perpetrators, system users, the systems, the 
third-party vendors, and companies whose services and 
networks systems are attached to the main organization’s 
supply chain system.  The threat actors are those consist of 
users, agents, cybercriminals, and other systems that aims at 
compromising the CSC systems and the security goal [8].  
The threat actor could be an internal or external attacker. The 
CSC system includes the various integrations of network 
nodes that make up the supplier chain system. The third-
party vendors include the organization on the supplier 
inbound and outbound chains that could be attacked, 
manipulated, or compromised.   
Inbound and Outbound Supply Chain: In a CSC 
environment, the network nodes and communication 
channels are those that integrate with the inbound and 
outbound supply chains systems. These are vendors, SMEs, 
suppliers, and distributors that are on the supply chain. The 
inbound suppliers are those with external remote access to 
the CSC system. The outbound chains are those that the 
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organization distributes including individuals, institutions, 
and vendors. The organization can experience attacks on the 
supply inbound and outbound chain that supports the 
application processes [8]. The threat actor could initial 
injection attacks or insert a redirect script into the vendor’s 
website and breach the software developed by the 
manufacturer that is used by the organization’s internal 
employers to distribute services to vendors and individuals. 
The goal of the attack could be to manipulate, alter or divert 
products and services after gaining access into the system.  
Vulnerabilities: CSC vulnerabilities are the loopholes and 
configuration flaws that exist on the supply chain system and 
network nodes that could be exploited by an attack, threat 
actor or a threat agent. These network vulnerabilities [36] are 
those that exist on the supply inbound and outbound chains 
including the network nodes, switches, IP addresses, and 
firewalls. The vulnerable spots on the CSC system could be 
identified from various sources including the software, the 
network, website, the user, processes, the application, and 
configuration or the third-party vendor.  Properties include 
asset type, source, node, effect and criticality.  
Attack: An attack is any deliberate action or assault on the 
supply chain system with the intent to penetrate a system, to 
be able to gain access then manipulate and compromise 
processes, procedures, and delivery channels of electronic 
products, the information flows, and services [2]. Properties 
include the type of attack, pattern, prerequisites, and vectors. 
We consider attack inputs and outputs parameters for our 
study and the attack concepts for our prediction. Inputs of 
attack include the tools, capabilities, vectors and knowledge 
of the vulnerabilities of the domain to exploit. Outputs of the 
attacks are the patterns, access gained by the threat actor, the 
methods deployed, TTPs, the loopholes exploited, and the 
extent of malware propagation and cascading effects.  This 
includes those attacks on cyber physical and cyber digital 
systems such as hardware, network, IP addresses, and 
software. The OT and IT delivery mechanisms could be 
manipulated before the product gets to the consumer [8].  
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) consist of the 
specific adversary behaviour exhibited in an attack [14]. It 
leverages on resources such as tools, infrastructures, 
capabilities and personnel. It provides information on the 
victim's target (who, what or where), that are relevant to 
exploit targets being targeted, intended effects, kill chain 
phases, handling guidance and resources of the TTP 
information [8][9]. Threats actors’ mode of operation is to 
commit attacks such as Hijacking, social engineering, and 
footprints, privilege escalation, and reconnaissance penetrate 
a supply chain. 
CSC Requirement: CSC requirements are the constraints 
and security expectations for the system required to support 
CSC stakeholders and business needs. The data gathered 
from stakeholders inform business processes, system 
infrastructures, internal and external user expectations 
required for the supply chain system developments and 
operations [2]. The requirements process and constraints that 
are generated during the requirements engineering phase 
forms the basis for the system constraints and statements that 
support the user and system requirements used to achieve the 
organizational goal. The requirements consist of attributes 
such as user categories, stakeholders, description, user ID, 
acceptance criteria, time constraints, owners and sources. 
The requirements concepts include properties such as 
organizational requirements, business requirements, system, 
user, and operational requirements. The organizational 
requirements describe the organizational high-level 
objectives that must be performed to achieve the 
organizational goal. The business requirements explain the 
requirement specifications and the properties include 
customer needs and expectations that must be integrated to 
meet the system requirements.  Systems requirements 
demand specific properties of the application, architecture 
and the technical requirements need to be able to describe the 
features and how the system must function. These system 
requirements properties include the constraints, assumptions 
and acceptance criteria and the external entities that will be 
interacting with the system. They include supply chain 
systems processes and constraints that are generated during 
the requirements engineering phase that forms the basis for 
the system.  
Indicators: Indicators are parameters that express that an 
attack of this type is imminent, in progress or has occurred 
[32]. Properties required to determine the indicators of 
compromise includes incident type, source, date & time, 
impact Motive and intents. The properties are used to 
determine threat activities, adversary behaviours, TTPs, 
risky events, or state of the incident to determine what could 
serve as an indicator of compromise. CSC attack incidents 
and course of actions provide intelligence about the nature of 
cyberattack indicators and TTPs that can be deployed on the 
supply chain especially from the third-party vendor’s 
perspective. Indicators convey specific observable patterns 
combined with contextual information intended to represent 
artefacts and or behaviours of interest within a cybersecurity 
context.  
Cyber  incident report: Cybersecurity incident could be 
defined as a breach of system security to affect its integrity 
or availability. It includes unauthorized access or attempted 
to access a system or causing a disruptive event to essential 
services. Cybersecurity incident reporting platform provides 
individuals and organizations with a system to reports cyber 
incidents they have experienced unexpectedly or any unusual 
network issues, or suspected fraud or cybercrime activities 
[31]. Properties for cyber incident reporting include attack 
type, date and time of the incident, source of the attack, cause 
of an attack, duration, impact on service, impact on staff and 
public safety Cyber incident report system is required for 
cyber threat analysis and to determine the threat level and 
categorizing. It is used to predict cyberattacks and generate 
intelligence require to mitigate cyberattacks and for threat 
information sharing.  
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Threat information sharing: Threat information sharing is 
used to provide information necessary to assist an 
organization in identifying, assessing, monitoring, and 
responding to cyber threats [32]. Cyber threat information 
includes indicators of compromise, tactics, techniques, and 
procedures used by threat actors, security alerts and threat 
intelligence reports. It provides findings from the analysis of 
cyber incidents and suggests actions to take to prevent 
cyberattacks, detect, protect, contain, and mitigate cyber 
incidents. Properties for cyber threat information sharing 
include information-sharing goals, information sources, 
scope, sharing community and support. Some rules govern 
and protect information sharing, such as information 
sensitivity and privacy, sharing designations, and tracking 
procedures [32]. It provides a basis for an organization to 
leverage their combined knowledge, information, 
experience, and competencies to gain intelligence and 
understanding of potential threats for remediation and 
controls.  
Controls: Controls are security mechanisms that are put in 
place to secure organizational business operations and 
processes. They are security strategies and measures 
formulated and implemented to ensure that the 
organizational goal and objectives are achieved [2][13]. 
These controls include directive, detective, preventive, 
corrective and recovery. Directive controls are more 
strategic and relevant with the specific supplier inbound and 
outbound chain requirements. These are intended to align 
organizational and security goals with that of supplier and 
third-party vendors on the supply chain and provide 
guidelines for system usage and processes. Preventive 
controls are policies that are put in place for the technical and 
physical infrastructures protection. These are derived from 
standard measures intended to preclude actions violating 
policy or increasing third party risks to the supply chain 
system resources. Detective Controls use supply chain attack 
indicators to identify practices, processes, and tools that 
identify and possibly react to security violations. These 
include Firewall, IDS, IPS and the various configurations 
required for the supply chain systems.  Corrective controls 
involve physical, administrative, and technical measures. 
Recovery controls includes backup plans, regular updates 
and contingency planning to ensure integrity or availability 
of the CSC in the event of an incident. Once an incident 
occurs on the CSC system that results in the compromise of 
integrity or availability, the implementation of recovery 
controls is necessary to restore the system or operation to a 
normal operating state. These include countermeasures, 
backups, segmentation, and an incidence response strategy.  
 
The meta-model in Figure 1 explains relationships among the 
concepts.  The organizational goal is determined by the 
product and services that are produced. The security goal is 
to ensure that the supply chain systems that support these 
products and services are secured. CSC organization needs a 
list of requirements to satisfy for achieve its goals.  The TTP 
as a CTI properties  exploits  both inbound and outbound  
vulnerabilities for a successful attack. Cyber incident report 
provides a detailed about the incident including 
vulnerability, indicator and incident time frame. This report 
needs to share among the CSC stakeholders.  There are 
controls which are required to tackle the threats.
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Figure 1:   Meta-Model 
 
IV.THE PROPOSED APPROACH 
This section discusses the proposed approach that aims to 
improve the CSC security. It includes an integration of CTI 
and ML and a systematic process (presents in the Section 5) 
.  Additionally, the underlying concepts of the proposed 
approach such as actor, goal, TTP, vulnerability, incident 
and controls, is also mentioned in Section 3. The  approach 
considers both inbound and outbound chains for the 
vulnerability so that CSC organisation can focus on the 
possible system flaws. The approach adopts the CTI process 
to gather and analyse the threat data and  ML techniques to 
predicate the threat. ML techniques are used on classification 
algorithms to learn a dataset for performance accuracies and 
predictive analytics.  The rationale for integrating CTI and 
ML for threat prediction is that the CTI lifecycle process 
supports input parameters for detecting known attacks 
whereas ML provides output parameters for predicting 
known and unknown attacks for future trends.  
 
A. INTEGRATION OF CTI AND ML 
The approach combines CTI processes with ML techniques 
for cyber threat predictive analytics. The goal is to detect 
vulnerabilities and indicators of compromise on CSC 
network system nodes using known attacks to predict 
unknown attacks. We apply the CTI techniques to gather 
threats (Known attacks) and ML techniques to learn the 
dataset to predicate cyber threats (unknown attacks) on CSC 
systems. The inputs are the attacks and TTP that are 
deployed by threat actors to compromise a system. The 
attack feature uses properties such as attack type, pattern, 
attack vectors, and prerequisites to determine the nature of 
the attack that was deployed. The TTP consists of attack 
patterns and attack vectors deployed by the threat actor. The 
TTP parameter includes the capabilities of the threat actor 
and threat indicators. The threat actor feature uses properties 
such as user, system and third-party vendors to determine the 
vulnerable spots and type of tools used for the attack to 
determine the attack pattern. Tools are the attack weapons or 
software codes used by the threat actor for reconnaissance 
and to initiate an attack. For instance, the threat actor could 
use Nmap tool for scanning a network, Kali Linux tool for 
penetration and, Metasploit tool for exploiting loopholes in 
a network. The output parameters are the vulnerabilities and 
indicators of compromise that are used as threat intelligence. 
The capability of the threat actor could be determined by the 
ability to penetrate a system and course Advance Persistent 
threat (APT) attack and take command and control C&C) the 
extent of propagation is used to determine the indicators. 
Finally, we consider various controls  such as directive, 
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preventive, detective corrective and recovery  required to 
secure the CSC system. 
The rationale for our predictive analytics approach is based 
on the premise that the cyberattacks phenomenon includes a 
lot of invincibility, and uncertainties and the makes the threat 
landscape unpredictable. Similarly, due to the changing 
organizational requirements, various integrations, varying 
business processes and the various delivery mechanisms, 
predicting cyberattacks in the CSC organization context has 
been challenging. To achieve that, first, the proposed 
approach considers relevant related works and the meta-
model concepts to model the CSC attacks and CTI phases. 
For instance, we identify supply inbound and outbound chain 
attack indicators and integrate them into CTI phases. Further, 
the concepts are analysed using the CTI process lifecycle and 
ML techniques to learn the dataset for our prediction. 
Furthermore, we use the input and output parameters as 
indicators for our threat prediction. Finally, the threat 
prediction results are evaluated to provide informed 
intelligence regarding the various attacks and future threats 
that are unknown for appropriate control mechanisms. 




























Figure 2: Applying CTI and ML for threat intelligence and Predictive Analytics 
V. THRAT ANALYSIS AND PREDICATION 
PROCESS   
This section discusses the overall process for the CSC threat 
analysis, prediction, and control in line with the proposed 
approach in section 3. The process includes four sequential 
phases. It follows a methodical approach and a causal 
process for each phase to determine strategy, threat analysis, 
threat prediction, and controls. Each phase includes steps and 
activities required to achieve the purpose of the phases as 
shown in Figure 3.  The activities include identifying the 
organization’s CSC and security strategy, ML 
classifications, infrastructures, attack context, input and 
output parameters for our prediction. The activities for the 
threat analysis phase include the identification and gathering 
of threat information, risk assessment and analysis to 
determine the threat actor, threat profile, TTP and IoC. The 
activities for the threat prediction phase consider the input 
parameters for the ML algorithms, predict threats and for 
performance evaluation by using ML techniques to learn 
datasets. The control activities include identifying required 
controls for the CSC systems including internal and external 
audits to formulate security policies and control 
mechanisms. We expound on the phases and process further 
as below by following the process flow as shown in Figure 
3.   
A.PHASE 1: DETERMINE STRATEGY  
CSC security strategy combines CTI and cybersecurity risk 
strategy including mechanisms, resources and plans to 
determine how security goals and controls will be 
formulated, implemented and achieved in line with 
organization goal and objectives. It includes identifying, 
analyzing, reviewing and evaluating organizational assets 
including infrastructures, resources and implementation 
procedures.  CSC security strategy combines, CTI and 
cybersecurity risk assessment strategy to gather intelligence 
and formulate policies. Strategic, tactical and operational 
management roles and responsibilities are recursive and 
support each other to ensure security goals are achieved. 
Strategic management uses intelligence decision to support 
plans that determine security goals and assign responsibility 
including executive authorization of blueprints and budget 
allocation. Tactical management decision regarding the 
execution of strategic management blueprints including 
security requirements capturing, third party audit, 
configuration management plans, uses indicators of 
compromise to determine controls and validations. The 
operational level managers ensure the day-to-day 
implementation of the security goals including monitoring, 
determining TTPs and escalating threat alerts for 
remediation and controls. CTI Strategy provides 
management evidence-based knowledge gathered about 
threats actors, attacks, patterns, vectors, vulnerabilities, 
TTPs, motives, intents and capabilities of the adversary. Risk 
Assessment Strategy considers the organizational goal and 
assets and develops an overall CSC risk strategy that 
determines the policies required to guide the organizational 
business processes. It includes risk assessment, CSC 
requirements capturing and business function. The risk 
strategy also considered implementation strategies and 
procurement policies for OT and IT acquisitions and 
integrations of assets.  
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B.PHASE 2: THREAT ANALYSIS  
This threat analysis phase follows the CTI techniques to 
determine and analyse the threats of the CSC context. It 
requires the CSC strategy information for his purpose and 
includes three activities. 
Activity 1:  Identify and Gather Information 
This step identifies all vulnerable spots on the supply 
inbound and outbound chains on the meta-model that is used 
as indicators for an attack. For instance, in case of a malware 
attack, this activity looks for the relevant information such 
as the source of the attack, the tools, patterns and the attack 
vectors from the analysis of the malware attack that used as 
our indicator.  To determine the indicators of an attack, we 
use threat activities, adversary behaviours, risky events, or 
state of the incident to determine what could serve as an 
indicator. The indicators may be used to identify any inherent 
vulnerabilities that could be exploited by a threat actor. If 
necessary, the activity carrying out penetration testing, 
vulnerability assessment test and threat propagation 
exercises to determine the supply inbound and outbound 



















Figure 3. Predictive Analytics Process 
Activity 1:  Identify and Gather Information 
This step identifies all vulnerable spots on the supply 
inbound and outbound chains on the meta-model that is used 
as indicators for an attack. For instance, in case of a malware 
attack, this activity looks for the relevant information such 
as the source of the attack, the tools, patterns and the attack 
vectors from the analysis of the malware attack that used as 
our indicator.  To determine the indicators of an attack, we 
use threat activities, adversary behaviours, risky events, or 
state of the incident to determine what could serve as an 
indicator. The indicators may be used to identify any inherent 
vulnerabilities that could be exploited by a threat actor. If 
necessary, the activity carrying out penetration testing, 
vulnerability assessment test and threat propagation 
exercises to determine the supply inbound and outbound 
chains on the OT and IT by following the below stages [2].   
● Stage 1. Reconnaissance: The threat actor uses APT 
methods to gather intelligence and searches the 
organization's websites to gather footprints and identify 
vulnerable spots on the network nodes.   
● Stage 2. Experiment: The threat actor uses penetration 
testing and vulnerability assessment methods various attack 
patterns, TTP methods, and tools to explore vulnerable spots. 
The attacks include spear phishing malware or Remote 
Access Trojan.  
● Stage 3. Exploit: the threat actor initiates attack to gain 
access to the system and other resources of the system. The 
attack could manipulate, alter and redirect deliveries or 
initiate and propagate malware. 
● Stage 4. Command and Control: The threat actor maintains 
a continuous presence on the system and can change his 
password to maintain a presence on the CSC using advanced 
persistent threat attack, remote access command to steal 
intellectual properties and cause cyber espionage attacks. 
Most organizations use automated password changing 
system that prompts users to change their password 
periodically and that could be exploited by the threat actor. 
The threat actor can change the password and obfuscate in a 
Command & Control environment [2].  
 
Activity 2: Risk Assessments 
The risk assessment activity includes the process to mitigate 
CSC risks by determining the probability and impact of CSC 
attacks and threats as well as the vulnerable spots that could 
be exploited within the cyber supply inbound and outbound 
chains and third-party organizations. It identifies all threats 
that may pose a risk on the system. Risk assesses the CSC 
security domain and analyse risks access spots that are 
capture captured.  Develop mitigating techniques to control 
the risks by identifying risks posed by auditing the third-
party organizations. Classify them based on their service 
provisions and levels of integration to the various supply 
chain network system.  
Activity 3: Analysis 
This activity focuses on analysis of the threats to determine 
the actual source of the attack, the type of attack, the attack 
pattern, the TTP and attack vectors. This will assist to assign 
the IoC required and what controls are needed. The threat 
analysis techniques include: 
● Stage 1. Threat Activity: Determine the nature of attack, 
pattern and sources of penetration on the CSC.  
● Stage 2: Threat Manipulation: Determines the nature of 
cybercrimes committed and the extent of the penetration to 
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● Stage 3: Threat Impact: Determines the severity of the 
attack, malware propagation and the cascading effects on the 
supply chain. These determinants influence the risk factors 
and the degree of severity of the attacks.   
 
C.PHASE 3: THREAT PREDICATION 
The phase considers CSC system nodes that are vulnerable 
to cyberattacks by integrating CTI and ML to obtain attack 
predictions of known and unknown attacks using three 
sequential activities.  
Activity 1: Determine Input Parameters  
The input parameters mainly consider the attack and TTP to 
demonstrate how the attackers penetrate a system.   In 
particular, threat actors’ properties such as capability and 
attack vector, tools are used for the input parameters.  
● Step 1: Feature Selection: This step includes different 
ML techniques to select the available features that exist in 
the data. These feature selection techniques include 
dimensionality reductions in large datasets for effective and 
reliable training, testing and prediction. The features we use 
for our prediction are malware, spyware, spear phishing and 
Rootkit attacks.  
● Step 2:  Choosing a Classifier and Performance Metrics: 
We classify the various algorithms such as LR, DT, SVM 
and RF in VM to determine (1) the different types of 
responses based on an attack and (2) different types of 
response give the TTP deployed. For our study, we use the 
binary classification as it supports AUC-ROC in 
distinguishing between the probabilities of the given classes. 
Further, its precisions can predict correct instances, provides 
a harmonic mean of precision and recall for the F-score.  
Determining the right performance metrics to evaluate the 
algorithms, influences the performance measures and how 
the algorithm are compared with others. Not using the right 
metrics could cause overfitting problems and impact on how 
we evaluate our predictions.  
Activity 2: Predict Threats 
  This activity aims to predicate vulnerabilities and IoC as 
output feature. The vulnerabilities provide the organization 
intelligence about areas that are exploitable and the IoC 
provides the indicators of penetrations, cybercrimes 
compromises, APTs and C&Cs. Using the cyber threat 
analysis and the inputs features, we use ML techniques and 
dataset to predict the output features. The vulnerable spots 
include network nodes, firewalls, antivirus and anti-
malware. The IoC includes the unknown attacks and the 
extent of cybercrime manipulations, alteration, deletions, 
exfiltration and redirections that the threat actor could deploy 
on the system. The stealthy nature of such attacks is so 
uncertain it cannot be determined on the face value. This 
includes gathering various attack probabilities and their 
propagation effects on the CSC using ML techniques to train 
and test dataset to learn and to gain accurate predictions. The 
process involves: 
• Applying ML techniques to learn the data events from 
IDS/IPS and firewall logs to collect signatures, threat 
indicators and, antimalware logs from the various 
supply chain endpoints. The ML techniques consider 
LR, SVM, DT, RF and MV algorithms  to determine the 
accuracies of our predictions.  
• Determining false positives and false-negative rates.  
• Analyse ML results, logs and alerts to understand the 
attack trends as identified in the initial process to gather 
intelligence as to what happened, how, why, when, who 
and where the attack is initiated from.  
 
Activity 3: Performance Evaluation 
The performance of the models will be evaluated based on 
the following values: True Positive (TP), True Negative 
(TN), False Positive (FP) and False Negative (FN). Further, 
the FP and FN will be determined based on the elements of 
the confusion matrix. We follow the following steps for the 
performance evaluation. 
 
Step 1: Using Confusion Metrics to Determine TP and FP 
Outcomes  
A confusion matrix is a two-dimensional matrix that 
evaluates the performance of a classification model with 
respect to a specific test dataset. It basically compares the 
actual target values with those predicted by the machine 
learning model. It provides a better understanding of the 
values by calculating the data in the matrix and analyse them 
to determine any positive or negative classifications. Four 
outcomes are determined when classifying the instances of 
the dataset. These include True Positive (TP), True Negative 
(FP), False Positive (FP) and False Negative (FN) rates. For 
instance, in an event where an instance is positive, and the 
outcome is classified as positive, its TP else its FP. Where 
the instance is negative and the outcome is classified as 
negative, it is counted as TN, else it is FN [15]. We consider 
the following method to understand the confusion matrix. 
The accuracy of the confusion metric is the proportion of the 
total number of predictions that are considered as accurate. 
We use the following equation below to determine the TPR, 




        (1) 
 
The recall or true positive rate (TPR) is the proportion of the 
total number of correct predictions. We consider the equation 
as:  




        (2) 
 
 
Finally, precision (P) is the proportion of the predicted 





       (3) 
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F-measure of F1 – Score (F) is used as the harmonic mean to 
determine the combinations of precision and recall. We use 




      (4) 
 
Step 2:  Determine Mean Absolute Error (MAE) and Mean 
Square Error (MSE) 
MAE determines the sum of the absolute mean or normal 
curve of the difference vector between predicted and real 
values. Whereas MSE determines the mean or normal 
difference by taking the absolute value of the square root of 
the mean and convert the units back to the original unit of the 
output variable and provide a gross idea of the magnitude of 
the error.  For us to predict real numbers or regressions, we 
used MAE and MSE . The activities include Import AUC-
ROC Function, Import Mean Absolute Error, Import Mean 
Square Error, and Set Entropy Criterion. Entropy is a concept 
used in information theory to determine the measure of 
uncertainty about the source of data. It is a unique function 
that satisfies the four uncertainties axions in a confusion 
matrix and gives us the degree of disorganization in our data. 
In an event where a given set of data may contain random 
collections of unstructured data, and entropy formula is used 
to separate the positive and negative rates as follows:  
Entrophy(E) = −a log2 𝑎 − 𝑏 log2 𝑏  
  
Where a = Proportion of positive examples and b = 
Proportion of negative examples. We use the formula to 
determine the results in our experiment. We ask the 
following question to derive the answer from the 
performance. 
• TP = Did the model predicted correctly for the positive 
class as positive? 
• TN = Did the model predicted correctly for the negative 
class as negative?  
• FP = Did the model predicted incorrectly the negative 
class as positive? 
• FN = Did the model predicted incorrectly the positive 
class as negative? 
 
PHASE 4: CONTROL 
This final phase aims to identify a list of controls that are to 
tackle the threat.  The controls should ensure that the 
required security strategic and mechanism are put in place to 
mitigate the threats.  This includes identifying security 
requirements, internal and external audit as well as threat 
monitoring and reporting. The process includes 
identification and review of existing controls, third-party 
audit and finally information sharing.  
 
VI. IMPLEMENTAION   
This section follows the implementation of the proposed 
approach to determine the applicability of our threat 
prediction.  We only follow threat identification, prediction 
and control phases for the implementation.   
A.THREAT ANALYSIS 
Threat analysis phase uses CTI approach to gather threat. We 
identify vulnerabilities on the network nodes, IP address, 
IEDs and the threats that are linked to the organizational goal 
that provide us with threat indicators. This includes the TTP 
used by threat actors and their modes of operations. For our 
analysis, we adopt the attack concepts and the properties 
from the meta-model to determine the attack pattern and the 
TTP deployed on the CSC.  The phase involves gathering 
sources of attacks, vulnerable spots, risks TTPs. Data are 
gathered from firewalls logs, collecting a signature, threat 
indicators and events from IDS/IPS, antimalware logs from 
the various endpoints. 
B.THREAT PREDICATION  
Further to the discussing in section 4, threat prediction 
involves using ML techniques to learn dataset for threat 
predictions of known and unknown attacks. We follow the 
ML process for our threat prediction.  
 
Description of Data 
We have considered the widely used dataset from a 
Microsoft Malware website for the implementation [6]. The 
dataset is about malware attacks in the Microsoft endpoint 
system. The data was collected by Microsoft Windows 
Defender with over 40,000 entries, with 64 columns and each 
row represents different telemetry data entries. The data 
represents malware attacks identified on various endpoint 
nodes from different locations with machine identities, 
timestamps, organizational identifier and default browser 
identifiers designed to meet various business requirements. 
The rationale for using the dataset is that the dataset does not 
represent Microsoft customer's machine only as it has been 
sampled to include a much larger proportion of malware 
infection machines. Therefore, we used this dataset for our 
predictive analytics as CSC systems integrate various 
network infrastructures for the business process and 
interoperability.  
 The feature description includes MachineIdentifier that 
considers individual machine ID on the network, 
GeoNameIdentifier, provides IDs for the geographic region 
a machine is located in. DefaultBrowsersIdentifier, provides 
ID for the machine's default browsers. 
OrganizationIdentifier, provides ID for the organization the 
machine belongs in. Is protected, provides a calculated field 
derived from the Spynet Report's AV Products field. 
Processor considers the process architecture of the installed 
operating system. HasTpm, indicates true if the machine has 
TPM (Trusted Platform Module). Over, looks at the version 
of the current operating system. OsBuild, information 
indicating the build of the current operating system. 
Census_DeviceFamily AKA DeviceClass, indicates the type 
of device that an edition of the OS is intended for desktop 
and mobile. Firewall, this attribute is true (1) for Windows 
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8.1 and above if windows firewall is enabled, as reported by 
the service [6]. 
 
Data Preparation 
The activity involves uploading the data from a website APIs 
or an HTML file and selecting the data we need then save it 
as CSV file. We prepare the data by converting the average 
of the columns of the dataset. Furthermore, we loaded the 
data from a pre-prepared dataset by calling the categories of 
the machine learning identifier: The output generated 40,000 
training datasets with 62 variables. Handling NaN (Not a 
Number) in training set by using a command that removes 
all the NaN in the training set into the dictionary and prints 
the output. Furthermore, we create a NaN dictionary to 
handle all the unwanted duplicate data. The output prints 62-
8 = 54. (8 columns removed).  
 
Feature Selection  
The main features are identified from the primary dataset that 
are relevant to our work. There were 62 features in the 
primary data and the focus is on the concepts of attacks, tools 
and vulnerabilities from our previous work. We 
characterized threat actor activities, including presumed 
intent and historically observed behaviour, for the purpose of 
ascertaining the current threats that could be exploited. 
Further, we identified eight vulnerable spots and their 
probability that the cyber attacker could exploit those spots 
namely the: Firewall, IDS/IPS, Vendors CSC system, 
Network, IP Addresses, Database, Software, and Websites.  
Building New Features into the Dataset 
The features considered as input parameters for the 
predictions are the attack and TTP as discussed in section 
3.2. To achieve that, we determine the types of attack, tools, 
vectors, and capabilities for the input. we build the features 
in line with the existing dataset feature description in [6]. 
Further, features for predicting the attack inputs and outputs 
are identified by deriving new features that are in line with 
the existing datasets and features [6] in table 2.  These 
features and variables are related to the dataset for our work. 
Attack patterns are an abstract mechanism for describing 
how a type of observed attack is executed [32]. The output 
parameters are determined after our evaluation using the 
attack pattern, TTPs, vulnerabilities as indicators of 
compromise. Furthermore, the attack profiles for the ML 
prediction are built-in dataset. The main goal of our work is 
to be able to build attack profiles for our ML to predict which 
node is vulnerable and likely to be attacked. We may not be 
able to use exact features, but we consider characteristics that 
are correlated with them and are relevant to represent how 
the attacks are initiated and the vulnerabilities are exploited 
for our future prediction. Hence, many features that we 
analysed were chosen to represent the CTI and security 
awareness of the stakeholders. 
Choosing an Optimization Algorithm for the 
Classifiers 
For us to choose the classifiers as discussed in section 4.1.3. 
activity 1, step 2. we used a pipeline to connect the various 
classifications. We use the 10-Fold cross-validation to 
determine the parameter estimation. The 10-Fold cross-
validation run and validate the parameter ten times on each 
algorithm as the values may change and may not generate the 
accurate result when we run it only ones. For the test, we 
used 10-fold cross validation for more accurate predictive 
results. The GridsearchCV provides an exhaustive search 
over specified parameter values for an estimator.  We 
combine all the four algorithms using Majority Voting (MV) 
algorithm in the classifiers to determine the mean score of 
the total results. Finally, we use ROC-AUC to distinguish 
between the accuracies of the binary classification for the 
predictions [32].  
Evaluating the Accuracy of the Threats 
We consider the following method to understand the 
confusion matrix as discussed in section 5. The accuracy of 
the confusion metrics is the proportion of the total number of 
predictions that are considered as accurate. Using the 
equation in section 5, we evaluate the accuracies (AC) of the 
metrics to answer the performance of the TP, TN, FP, FN 
rates in (V) as follows:  
TABLE 1. MATRIX TO COMPUTE THE ACCURACY, PRECISION, 
RECALL AND THE F- SCORE. 
Number = 185 Predicted Yes Predicted No 
Actual Yes TP =180 FN = 20 
Actual No FP = 40 TN = 120 
𝐴𝐶 =
180 + 120




Using the table 3, and the algorithm, we answer the following 
question to derive the values for the performances. The False 
positive rate (FPR) determines the rate of negative cases that 
were incorrectly classified as positive.   
● FP = Did the model predicted incorrectly the negative class 








The result indicates that FPR of 0.25 negative cases were 
incorrectly classified as positive. Whereas the true negative 
rate (TNR) is defined as the number of negative cases that 
were classified. 
● TN = Did the model predicted correctly for the negative 






The result indicates TNR of 0.75 were the number of 
negative cases that were classified as negative.  
Further, the false negative rate (FNR) is the proposition of 
positive cases that were incorrectly classified as negative. 
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● FN = Did the model predicted incorrectly the positive 




= 0.1   
The results indicate that the FNR of 0.1 was the proposition 
of positive cases that were incorrectly classified as negative. 
The recall or true positive rate (TPR) is the proportion of the 
total number of correct predictions. We consider the equation 
as:  
● TP = Did the model predicted correctly for the positive 





   
  
The result indicates that the Recall or TPR of 0.9 was the 
proportion of the total number of instances that were 
identified correctly from the positive classes. To predict 
positive cases, we use precision (P) to determine the number 
of the proportion of instances is considered as correct. Hence 





   
 
The final precision (P) of 0.81 was determined as the 
proportion of the total number of positive instances that were 
predicted correctly. The results show that the precision, 
recall and F-Score used to determine the accuracy and 
precision of the predictions are considered as accurate 
between the positive and negative rates. The result indicates 
that the F-Score of 0.85 was the harmonic mean between 
precision and recall.  The Entropy is 0 if all member of E 
belongs to the same class, or 1 if they have the same number 
of samples in each group. The function entropy varies in 
range from 0 or 1.  
Accuracy of the Algorithms in ROC-AUC 
Figure 4 depicts the ROC curve that determines the binary 
classifier system that determines the thresholds of the 
algorithms. We used AUC_ROC (Area Under Curve – 
Receiver Operating Characteristics) to model the selection 
metric for the bi-multiclass classification problem to 
distinguish between the probabilities of the given classes. 
AUC_ROC determines the True Positives Rates and False 
Negatives Rates. We plot the accuracy of all the algorithms 
in ROC. A 10-fold cross validation was used to determine 
the accuracy of the LR, DT, SVM and RF algorithms in the 
ROC. The black, orange, blue and green colours represent 
the algorithms. The x-axis represented as True Positive Rate 
and y-axis as False Positive rate. We used a python script to 
plot the graph figure below:   
 
 
Figure 4. Plot the accuracy of all the algorithms in ROC 
curve for the LG, DT, RF, and SVM in MV  
10-fold cross-Validation 
• ROC AUC: 0.66(+ ∕ − 0.02) [Logistic Regression ]  
• ROC AUC: 0.63(+ ∕ −0.02) [Decision Tree ]  
• ROC AUC: 0.62(+ ∕ − 0.02) [Random Forest ]  
• ROC AUC: 0.66(+ ∕ − 0.02) [SVM ]  
• ROC AUC: 0.67(+ ∕ − 0.02) [Majority Voting ]  
 
The results indicate that LG and SVM produced the highest 
results after we have used the ROC-AUC.  
Determining the F-Score using Recall and Precision 
Rates 
For us to determine the precision, recall, and F-score, we 
answer the following questions regarding table 1. Precision: 
how many positive instances were predicted correctly? 
Recall: how many instances were identified correctly from 
the positive classes? F-score: what is the harmonic mean 
between precision and recall?  Using the results from 
evaluations in (I), we determine the F-Score and used the 
figures from the recall (0.9) and precision (0.81) to calculate 





                 
Incorporating ML and Case Study for 
Experimentation 
For us to determine the level of penetration, manipulation 
and the probability of an attack. We used a case study 
scenario of the remote CSC attack in [2] as below. The 
percentages figures were determined using the formula for 
calculating conditional probabilities in [2] from a low of 1 to 
a high of 100. The percentage figures in the penetration list 
are used for the result. The following is the scenario and the 
table from [2].  
 
Scenario 1. Remote attack on the CSC system 
The organization security team found that an adversary had 
intruded in the CSC system. The threat actor had 
compromised the workstation of the CMS that interfaced 
with suppliers, distributors, and third-party vendors. The 
organization's electronic products had been altered for some 
time. The CMS generated inaccurate customer electricity 
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consumptions, which compromised the amount the 
customers were paying for their utility bills, their online 
payments, and third-party vendor systems. The organization 
used two types of payment systems, the prepaid system and 
post-paid system, that were all integrated into the CMS and 
HEMS. Using the formula for calculating conditional 
probabilities [2] and Activity 1 and Table 4, we determined 
the vulnerable spots, the severities of manipulation in 
percentages, and threat indicators.  The percentages figures 
were calculated using the formula for calculating conditional 
probabilities. Further, the figures in penetration list are used 
to calculate the precision, recall and F-Score in section 6 for 
the results. 
TABLE 2: PROBABILITY AND THREAT INDICATORS 
Scenario Vulnerable Spots Penetration Manipulation (%) Probability Threat Indicators 
1 Firewall Y 70 High Wrong Firewall 
2 IDS/IPS Y 60 High Configuration 
3 Vendor Y 80 High Audit 
4 Network Y 40 Medium Sub-netting 
5 IP Y 55 Medium Segmentation 
6 Database Y 75 High Sanitizations 
7 Software Y 75 High Reprogram  
8 Website Y 90 High SSL/TLS 
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS  
This section presents and analyses the results of the threat 
prediction. We follow a number of assessment parameters 
such as attack probability, TTP, vulnerable spots, and IoC for 
this purpose. The attack probability figures are derived from 
Table 2. The propagation is determined using a probability 
scale of 0–100%. A percentage score was given after 
calculating the degree of severity of each manipulation. 




• Prediction of an attack probability. 
Table 3 presents the performance of the classifications of LR, 
DT, SVM, RF algorithms in identifying the various 
responses of cyberattacks based on the given malicious 
attack. From the table, LR achieved an accuracy of 66%, DT, 
63% SVM 62% and RF 66%. Comparing the performance of 
the classifiers, LR and RF both performed better for the 
Precision, Recall and F-Score, whilst DT and SVM received 
a low precision, recall and F-score. Comparing that to the 
attack’s categories signifies that Malware, Ransomware and 
spyware attacks identified different types of responses with 
85% accuracy.
TABLE 3: PREDICT THE PROBABILITY OF AN ATTACK FROM THE VARIOUS ENDPOINTS. 
 LF DT SVM RF 
Accuracy (%) 66 63 62 66 
ATTACKS P       R        F P         R         F P         R         F P         R        F 
XSS/Session Hijacking 0.88 0.38   0.65 0.58    0.42   0.68 0.55   0.38   0.63 0.88   0.38   0.65 
Spyware/Ransomware 0.90   0.55   0.75 0.85    0.37   0.70 0.65   0.45   0.63 0.90   0.55   0.75 
Spear Phishing 0.81   0.17   0.71 0.55    0.28   0.66 0.58   0.36   0.63 0.81   0.17   0.71 
Session Hijacking 0.73   0.36   0.62 0.48    0.35   0.61 0.55   0.38   0.63 0.73   0.36   0.62 
Rootkit/DDoS 0.56   0.37   0.65 0.57    0.33   0.58 0.53   0.35   0.63 0.56   0.37   0.65 
RAT/Island Hopping 0.68   0.30   0.73 0.55    0.22   0.69 0.51   0.25   0.63 0.68   0.30   0.73 
Ransomware/Malware 0.88   0.53   0.60 0.59    0.26   0.71 0.54   0.31   0.63 0.88   0.53   0.60 
Malware/Spyware 0.81   0.48   0.68 0.58    0.51   0.73 0.55   0.45   0.63 0.81   0.48   0.68 
DDoS 0.78   0.36   0.65 0.55    0.33   0.55 0.51   0.32   0.53 0.78   0.36   0.65 
 
● Prediction of TTP deployed based on the response of the 
cyberattacks.  
Table 4 presents the performance of the classification 
algorithms in identifying the various TTPs deployed, and 
responses based on the given attack vectors. Comparing the 
TTPs against the attack categories, XSS, session hijacking 
and RAT attack, DT and SVM achieved a low content for  
 
the low precision recall and F-score.  However, LR received 
the highest precision and F-score for malware attack with 
83% accuracy for TTPs deployed. Furthermore, ransomware 
and spyware attacks identified different types of responses 
for the TTPs with 83% accuracy for the harmonic mean in 
identifying the attack vectors being rootkit, email 
attachments and RAT.  
 
 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI
10.1109/ACCESS.2021.3087109, IEEE Access
 
VOLUME XX, 2017 2 
TABLE 4: IDENTIFY THE DIFFERENT TTP DEPLOYED BASED ON THE RESPONSE OF THE CYBERATTACKS 
 
 LF DT SVM RF 
Accuracy 66% 63% 62% 66% 
ATTACKS P       R        F P         R         F P         R         F P         R        F 
XSS/Session Hijacking 0.82   0.26   0.55  0.55    0.31   0.61 0.55   0.27   0.56 0.82   0.26   0.55  
Spyware/Ransomware 0.88   0.51   0.71  0.65    0.33   0.62 0.65   0.31   0.61 0.88   0.51   0.71  
Spear Phishing 0.71   0.23   0.61  0.53    0.22   0.56 0.58   0.36   0.59 0.71   0.23   0.61  
Session Hijacking 0.63   0.26   0.58  0.52    0.28   0.52 0.56   0.38   0.48 0.63   0.26   0.58  
Rootkit/DDoS 0.51   0.27   0.63  0.51    0.31   0.58 0.48   0.35   0.57 0.51   0.27   0.63  
RAT/Island Hopping 0.68   0.28   0.68  0.54    0.21   0.61 0.51   0.25   0.58 0.68   0.28   0.68  
Ransomware/Malware 0.86   0.44   0.66  0.58    0.22   0.65 0.59   0.31   0.62 0.86   0.44   0.66  
Malware/Spyware 0.79   0.41   0.67  0.65    0.51   0.63 0.55   0.45   0.61 0.79   0.41   0.67  
DDoS 0.71   0.36   0.61  0.55    0.33   0.55 0.55  0.32   0.53 0.71   0.36   0.61  
 
● Prediction of vulnerable spots based on the different 
types of responses of cyberattacks   
Table 5 presents the performance of the various 
classifications of the LR, DT, SVM and RF algorithms in 
identifying the vulnerable spots based on the different types 
of responses of cyberattacks. The vulnerable spots were 
identified from the CSC system probable threats table in [2] 
and used the manipulations figures for precision, recall and 
F-Score. LR and RF achieved a similar accuracy of 87% for 
the precision and F-score the successful attacks that signify 
the probability of exploits on the network nodes. Further, 
attacks such as malware and ransomware received higher 
precision based on the exploits and TTPS deployed with 92% 
accuracy. Whilst spear phishing, session hijacking and 
DDoS performs lower with the DT and SVM classifiers.  
 
TABLE 5:  PREDICT VULNERABLE SPOTS BASED ON THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF RESPONSES OF CYBERATTACKS 
 LF DT SVM RF 
ACCURACY 66% 63% 62% 66% 
ATTACKS P       R        F P         R         F P         R         F P         R        F 
XSS/Session Hijacking 0.63   0.60   0.61  0.65    0.61   0.62 0.61    0.59   0.60 0.62   0.59   0.61  
Spyware/Ransomware 0.85   0.83   0.80  0.86    0.81   0.83 0.82    0.79   0.81 0.83   0.78   0.80  
Spear Phishing 0.68   0.62   0.66   0.63    0.59   0.61 0.64    0.60   0.62 0.63   0.61   0.68  
Session Hijacking 0.66   0.61   0.64   0.65    0.61   0.64 0.62    0.59   0.60 0.63   0.60   0.62  
Rootkit/DDoS 0.64   0.60   0.61  0.63    0.61   0.58 0.61    0.57   0.59 0.64   0.38   0.58  
RAT/Island Hopping 0.64   0.61   0.63 0.65    0.62   0.64 0.64    0.61   0.62 0.64   0.33   0.58 
Ransomware/Malware 0.84   0.81   0.82  0.85    0.81   0.84 0.61    0.58   0.60 0.75   0.55   0.62  
Malware/Spyware 0.82   0.77   0.81  0.86    0.83   0.85 0.85    0.81   0.83 0.66   0.45   0.69  
DDoS 0.65   0.61   0.62 0.64    0.60   0.63 0.62    0.59   0.61 0.75   0.33   0.62 
● Predication of indicators of compromise (IoC).  
Table 6 presents the performance variations of the various 
classifications algorithms that identify what constitutes as 
indicators of compromise. With DDoS attack, RF presented 
the highest precision values of 83% compare to SVM 
indicating the extent of compromises on the network. LR 
received the highest precision and F-score for malware and 
spyware attacks, whereas RF and LR received the similar 
precision, recall and F-score. 
 
TABLE 6: INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE (IOC). 
 LF DT SVM RF 
Accuracy 66% 63% 62% 66% 
ATTACKS P       R        F P         R         F P         R         F P         R        F 
XSS/Session Hijacking 0.68   0.63   0.66  0.55    0.42   0.61 0.51   0.38   0.63 0.68   0.37   0.71  
Spyware/Ransomware 0.80   0.8   0.75  0.85    0.55   0.70 0.65   0.45   0.63 0.78   0.52   0.76  
Spear Phishing 0.81   0.17   0.71  0.55    0.65   0.70 0.55   0.45   0.63 0.77   0.17   0.68  
Session Hijacking 0.73   0.66   0.62  0.55    0.65   0.70 0.55   0.45   0.63 0.73   0.65   0.62  
Rootkit/DDoS 0.56   0.37   0.60  0.55    0.65   0.70 0.55   0.45   0.63 0.56   0.37   0.59  
RAT/Island Hopping 0.68   0.30   0.33  0.55    0.65   0.70 0.55   0.45   0.63 0.68   0.30   0.63  
Ransomware/Malware 0.70   0.33   0.62  0.55    0.65   0.70 0.55   0.45   0.63 0.72   0.33   0.60  
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Malware/Spyware 0.74   0.48   0.65  0.55    0.65   0.70 0.55   0.45   0.63 0.71   0.48   0.65  
DDoS 0.68   0.56   0.65  0.55    0.65   0.70 0.55   0.45   0.63 0.68   0.56   0.57  
VII. DISCUSSIONS 
The results for the predictive analytics are analysed in 
AUC_ROC as indicated in Figure 5. A 10-Fold cross-
validation was used to run each algorithm to determine the 
parameter estimation and validated the accuracies. The 
evaluation of the accuracies of the metrics to answer the 
performance of the TPR, TNR, FPR, FNR as shown in Table 
3. We determine the harmonic mean for the proportion of the 
total number of accuracies for the precision, recall, and F-
score. The proportion for the precision is 220 for the number 
of positive instances that were predicted correctly. The 
proportion of recall (0.9) instances was identified correctly 
from the positive classes. The F-score of (0.85) was the 
harmonic mean between precision and recall.   Hence, an 
accuracy of 85% is the total number of predictions that are 
considered accurate for the TPR and FPR. Further, we have 
a slight variation in our predictions of the TPF and FPR 
comparing the LR, DT, SVM, and RF algorithms in the 
pipeline and using MV for running them. However, the 
accuracy of the proportion of the total number of predictions 
remains accurate with an average of 65% and 30% as the 
combine values for the TPR and FPT respectively. 
Additionally, the results indicate that LG and SVM produced 
the highest results after we have used the ROC-AUC. The 
predictive analysis of our evaluation after we have used the 
CTI to gather information, gain knowledge and 
understanding of the organizational context and the 
situational awareness remains acceptable as compared to 
other literature that focused on ML only for predictions. The 
table 7 shows the list the attack categories and threat 
predictions.  
Table 6. combines the probability of attacks identified from 
previous work and map them with the feature descriptions of 
the threats to explains the predictive analytics [2]. The 
mapping includes attack categories, CSC attack features, and 
the threat describes for probable cause of attacks from the 
telemetry data and Microsoft endpoint protection threat 
report for the predictions. The attack categories were 
determined from the dataset of various threat descriptions 
from the telemetry data [23] that contains the properties of 
the various families of malware generated by the Windows 
defenders.  The CSC attack features were derived from the 
various families of malware that has the probability of 
infecting the various CSC endpoint nodes. The threat 
descriptions were gathered by the threat report collected by 
the Microsoft Windows Defender [23].  The results specify 
that spyware/ransomware scored 90%. All the attack 
categories that score 80% indicated that an XSS or session 
hijacking could be deployed on the CSC website as uses 
public facing IPs it connects to various vendors.   These 
could lead to spear phishing, rootkit and DDoS attacks. The 
rest of the threat prediction scores are explained in Table 7. 
TABLE 7. MAPPING THE ATTACK CATEGORY AND PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS 
Attack Category CSC Attack Features Threat Descriptions for Probable Cause of Attack Threat Predictions (%) 
1 
XSS/Session Hijacking Default Browser vulnerabilities and injecting a 
code in the URL or website 
80 
2-5 




Spear Phishing Use Reconnaissance to identify vulnerable 
spots and attach email with a virus 
80 
8-9 
Session Hijacking Exploit Unchanged Hard-Coded password in 
software bought off the shelf 
75 
10-14 
Rootkit/DDoS Attack on BIOS or attach a virus to a USB key 
to cascade when booting. 
80% 
15-20 
RAT/Island Hopping Attacks from Vendor systems to gain access to 
the organizational system 
70% 
21-28 
Ransomware/Malware Exploiting outdated OS versions and 
encryptions especially TLS/SSL 
60% 
29-35 Malware/Spyware Packet injection and Resonance attacks 70% 
36-38 
DDoS Exploit IP Address Systems and Packet 
injections 
55% 
The paper reveals several observations made from the CSC 
attacks to using CTI lifecycle processes for intelligence 
gatherings, and ML for predictive analysis for the overall 
Smart CPS security improvement. The study revealed that 
several challenges are facing the organization in securing 
their systems as attackers are executing arbitrary commands 
on the supply chain systems remotely and manipulating 
systems.  
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A. Mapping Cyberattacks on CSC for Predictive Analytics 
of Indicators of Compromise 
Table 8 provides details of how we mapped the cyberattacks 
on the CSC system for predictive analytics to determine the 
indicators of compromise. We used the threat modelling 
concepts in section 3, and the properties to identify the 
cyberattack, the attack pattern that were used, the vulnerable 
spots that were exploited, and the TTPs that are deployed by 
the threat actor on the CSC systems as the indicators of 
compromise (IoC). Indicators of compromise are parameters 
used to express whether an attack-type is imminent, in 
progress or has occurred. Refer [2] further reading on threat 
modelling. Threat actors use sophisticated and stealthy 
methods to inject a virus, worms, bugs or a Trojan into 
software or in an HTTP request in an ‘Island Hopping’ 
attack. The intent is to penetrate the network or gain access 
to the webserver when a request is being processed. The 
motive could be to manipulate the vulnerable spots, alter the 
software and delivery channels and maintain APT and 
command & control presence.   
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Using the C&C methods, the attacker can modify products 
during manufacturing, manipulate it during distributions and 
the various domain attacks. These attacks could cascade to 
other nodes on the supply inbound and outbound chains. The 
table below provides a matrix that blends the input and 
output parameters for the prediction. Our observation is that 
the following vulnerabilities exist in the cyber supply chain 
system: 
• The supply chain variables are accessible to the threat 
actor due to the business applications used for the supply 
chain variables and that could be exploited through the 
use of incorrect user data. 
• Information retrieved through inputted data is not 
configured properly due to poor validation.   
• The variables are not well encapsulated to prevent 
software redirect. For instance, setting an input variable 
as public in a class when developing the software source 
codes makes the website open to external attackers. 
B. Machine Learning for Predictive Analytics 
Machine learning approach to cybersecurity has been 
effective in analyzing and predicting future attacks and 
attack trends. We use ML techniques and classification 
algorithms including LD, SVM, DT, RF, and MV to develop 
threat intelligence techniques that can predict which nodes 
on our CSC system are venerable to attacks. We plot the 
accuracy of all the algorithms in ROC. AUC_ROC to 
determine the true positives and true negative rates. The 
results show that the best parameter result was SVM with an 
accuracy of 0.66.  ML provides us with the ability to combine 
algorithms to determine which of them produced the highest 
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accuracy and output for the best parameter for our prediction. 
However, it does not provide us with the ability to 
understand the threat actor’s motives and intents.   
C. Comparing Results with Existing Works  
A stated in the related works, there have a  lot of attention of 
using ML classifiers for cyber security.  A vector space 
model is  used for information retrieval for HTTP attacks 
using a decision tree algorithm to automatically label the 
request as malicious in the URL[11].  A number of 
classification algorithms LR, DT, NB, and SVM are 
considered  for cloud security and tested the models in 
diverse operational conditions using cloud security 
scenarios[20].  Further, [21] used data mining and ML 
methods on Artificial Neural Network, Association rules, 
Fuzzy Association rules and Bayesian Networks classifiers 
for cybersecurity detection and analytics in intrusion 
detection security applications. Furthermore, [22] compared 
ML datasets used for analyzing network traffic and anomaly 
detection relevant for modern intrusion detections datasets. 
Moreover, [23], explored the classification of logs using a 
decision tree algorithm that models the correlation and 
normalization of security logs. Similarly, [24] compared 
NNge. LF, DT, Naïve Bayes, and SVM classification 
algorithms performance and ML predictions for power 
system disturbance and cyberattack discriminations. Then, 
[25] used an instance-based learning classification algorithm 
to learn a dataset for feature reduction and detection 
techniques to detect cyberattacks on smart grid. 
Additionally, [26] used an ensembled learning model based 
on the combination of a random subspace with random tree 
to detect cyberattacks on Industrial IoT networks. Likewise, 
[28] explored mitigating techniques on IoT cybersecurity 
threats in a smart city by using ML techniques to learn 
dataset on LR, SVM, DT, RF, ANN and KNN classifiers for 
anomaly detections. Further, [29] proposed a novel adaptive 
trust boundary protection for Industrial IoT network by using 
deep learning on a semi supervised model for detecting 
unknown cyberattacks. Furthermore, [30]   used  deep neural 
network discriminator on a down sample encoder 
cooperative data generator train the algorithm to capture 
actual distribution of attack model on industrial IoT attack 
surface. Additionally, authors in [31] predicted cybersecurity 
incidents by using Naive Bayes and SVM algorithms to 
investigate and analyse various datasets collected from 
SMEs. Finally, [32] model a risk teller system that used ML 
to predict which machines are at risk of getting infected or 
are clean and forecast if an organization may experience 
cybersecurity incidents in the future.  Though all the works 
are relevant and contribute for the  cyber security 
improvement. However, there is a lack of  focus on the  
overall CSC   security and ML classifiers are mainly  used 
datasets for the threat predication. The proposed work 
presents a conceptual view by integrating relevant concepts 
from CSC and CTI domain. It provides a systematic threat 
analysis using the CTI techniques and integrates ML 
classifiers for the threat predication.   Additionally, we 
considered LG, DT, SVM, RF algorithms in Majority Voting 
to learn the malware threat prediction dataset.  
D. CSC Security Controls 
There are various security controls in existence, whose 
effectiveness are based on existing CSC attacks and risks 
including CIS Controls 2018 and ISO27002:2011. We 
recommend the approach to address the CSC security using 
threat intelligence gathered from known and unknown 
attacks in line with organizational objectives and provide 
security recommendations. Some organizations provide a 
recommendation, however, not all may be relevant to the 
cyber supply chain organizational objective. Table 9 identify 
basic concepts that are required to maintain security controls 
in the supply chain environment. To incorporate 
cybersecurity controls into a cyber supply chain system, we 
use knowledge of actual CSC attacks that have occurred in 
the past. A compromised supply chain system provides us 
with the knowledge of previous attacks to continually learn 
from and build effective and practical defences mechanisms. 
To ensure proper CSC security controls, the organization 
must form a strategic team to identify, investigate, review 
and evaluate the supply chain system processes and 
applications. 
 
TABLE 9. CSC SECURITY CONTROLS 
CSC 
Control 
Descriptions Asset Approach Implementation 
Directive Strategic management 
controls derived from 
the CTI and ML 
processes intended for 
policy formulation. 
Identify Critical 
Assets and Security 
Framework meet 
organizational goal 
Map CTI gatherings 
and ML predictive 
analytics results to 
security goal 
Assign controls to security 
teams to oversee the 
implementation. Adopt a 
framework or standard to 
support the development 
Preventive Proactive measures that 
are required to be 
implemented. 
Financial, physical, and 
technical measures 
intended to preclude 
actions violating policy 
Assign risks and 
threat levels to assets 
using CSCRM 
Determine Mitigations 
goals including internal 
and external audit 
controls 
Create awareness by organize 
training and workshops to train 
users 
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or increasing risk to 
system resources. 
Detective Develop business 
impact assessment.  
Involve the use of 
practices, processes, 
and tools that identify 
and possibly react to 
security violations. 
Implement periodic 





empt cyber threats 
Use impact analysis and 
cost benefit analysis to 
determine the cost of 
alternatives of not 
investing in detection 
tools 
Configure devices and 
automate passive tools on CSC 
systems to flag threats, run and 
monitor reports of firewalls, 
IDS/IPS, anti-malware and 
system updates 
Corrective Involve configurations 
and countermeasures 
designed to react to the 
detection of an incident 
to reduce or eliminate 
the zero-day attacks. 
Design security 
policies that inform 
what must be done in 
the event of an 
incident 
Develop Asset 
Inventory of all 
network nodes 




Implement Policies and 
business continuity plan to 
repair CSC systems, hard 
drive, patches systems, 
quarantine CSC systems 
Recovery Recovery strategy, 
Incident response and 
back up plans, regular 
updates and 
contingency planning to 
ensure integrity or 
availability of the CSC 
system 
Design policies and 
business impact 
assessment that can 
assist to restore the 
system or operation to 
a normal operating 
state upon any 
compromise as soon 
as possible. 
Develop disaster 
recovery plan that will 
restore system to its 
operational state. 
Form a team and Organize 
training and workshops to train 
staff to understand and be 
aware of the DRP 
implementations. 
 
E. Threat Information Sharing  
Threat information sharing is essential for any cyber physical 
system and specifically for the CSC context.  It helps supply 
chain organisations and its stakeholders to aware about the 
current threat trends so that appropriate control can be 
identified to tackle the attacks. The CTI information includes 
threat landscapes, TTPs, tools, and intelligence reports. The 
threat intelligence is shared amongst the various 
organizations, institutions, vendors and businesses on the 
CSC system for strategic management decision making. It 
designates information and creates situational awareness on 
the various security alerts, assess and monitor threats, risk 
and existing controls. Due to the sensitive nature of the 
intelligence and privacy rules, these organizations are 
required to sign an agreement to ensure the following: 
● Establish Information sharing rules 
● Establish security system and audit rules 
● Establish rules that govern the sharing of sensitive 
information 
● Establish information classification rules. (Need to 
Know) 
Challenges facing information sharing include the sensitivity 
nature of cyberattacks and the fact that it could lead to 
reputational damage, and sometimes legal ramifications. 
Most organizations are reluctant to share information 
relevant to CSC security.   
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The integration of complex cyber physical infrastructures 
and applications in a CSC environment have brought 
economic, business, and societal impact for both national 
and global context in the areas of Transport, Energy, 
Healthcare, Manufacturing, and Communication. However, 
CPS security remains a challenge as  vulnerability from any 
part of the system can pose risk within the overall supply 
chain context. This paper aims to improve CSC security by 
integrating CTI and ML for the threat analysis and 
predication. We considered the necessary concepts from  
CSC and CTI  and a systematic process to analyse and 
predicate the threat. The experimental results showed that 
accuracies of the LG, DT, SVM, RF algorithms in Majority 
Voting and identified a list of predicated threats. We also 
observed that CTI is effective to extract  threat information , 
which can integrate into the ML classifiers for the threat 
predication. This allows CSC organization to analyse the 
existing controls and determine additional controls for the 
improvement of overall cyber security. It is necessary to 
consider the full automation of the process and industrial 
case study to generalize our findings. Furthermore, we are 
also planning to consider evaluating the existing controls and 
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